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Resumen
Este trabajo utiliza un modelo de economía pequeña y abierta para analizar dos aspectos relevantes
de la política monetaria: (1) qué restricciones en la regla de política aseguran que el banco central
no introduzca indeterminaciones reales en la economía, y (2) cuál es la tasa de inflación óptima de
largo plazo. El modelo de economía pequeña y abierta presentado permite resaltar aspectos
importantes en ambos aspectos. Respecto del tema de la indeterminación, la simplicidad del modelo
permite hacer el análisis significativamente trasparente. Respecto de la tasa de inflación de largo
plazo, una economía pequeña y abierta enfrenta una tasa nominal de interés internacional dada. En
la medida que esta tasa de interés distorsione el comportamiento doméstico, existe un rol para tasas
nominales de interés domésticas positivas (en contraste con la celebrada cantidad óptima de dinero
de Friedman). Esta motivación surge naturalmente en el contexto de una economía pequeña y
abierta.
Abstract
This paper uses a small open economy model to address two outstanding issues in monetary policy:
(1) what restrictions on the policy rule ensure that the central bank does not introduce real
indeterminacy into the economy, and (2) what is the optimal long run rate of inflation.  The small
open economy model provides unique insights on both fronts.  In the case of determinacy issues, the
model’s simplicity makes the analysis remarkably transparent.  As for long run inflation rates, a
small open economy takes as given the foreign nominal interest rate.  To the extent that this rate
distorts domestic behavior, there is a role for positive domestic nominal rates (in contrast to
Friedman’s celebrated optimum quantity of money).  This motivation arises naturally in the setting
of a small open economy.
_______________________
This paper was prepared for the Third Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile “Monetary
Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms”, Santiago, Chile, September 20-21, 1999. E-mail:
ccarlstrom@clev.frb.org ; tfuerts@cba.bgsu.edu.I. Introduction.
The two central issues in monetary policy are separated by time horizon:  (1) the
short run: what is the appropriate monetary policy across the business cycle?  and (2) the
long run: what is the optimal long run rate of inflation?  This paper explores these classic
issues from the vantage point of a small open economy.  This “smallness” opens up both
possibilities and pitfalls for the policy-maker as several important variables (eg., the
foreign interest rate, the real exchange rate, the worldwide real rate of interest) are now
exogenous from the perspective of the home country.
The short run focus of monetary policy is to determine how best to respond to real
shocks buffeting the economy.  These real shocks include fiscal disturbances, fluctuations
in multifactor productivity, and movements in real exchange rates.   The central banker
must make decisions in real time in which the data problems are severe.  In particular, it
is typically unlikely that the central bank can respond directly to fundamental shocks, but
instead must respond to movements in endogenous variables.  For example, the central
bank will not immediately observe movements in productivity, but instead must respond
to movements in the rate of inflation.
These informational restrictions imply that the central bank must use a fairly
simple rule, where a rule is a reaction function linking movements in the nominal rate to
movements in endogenous variables (eg., the celebrated Taylor (1993) rule).  The last
several years of research has included numerous theoretical analyses of the welfare
advantages of different policy rules.  Papers include Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), Ireland
(1997), King and Wolman (1996), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).  These papers
posit structural models of the real economy and the monetary transmission mechanism.1
A principle conclusion of this line of research is that the welfare gain of being at the first-
best rule are small in comparison to the second or even tenth best.  For example, in a
limited participation model, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) report that the welfare gain of
switching from a money growth peg (a seemingly disastrous policy in the posited model)
to an interest rate peg (the second best policy) are quite small—representing 0.017% of
the steady state capital stock.
As a consequence of these small welfare numbers, the focus of recent research has
shifted to a related question—how to avoid doing harm.  Papers include Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1997), King and Kerr (1996), Benhabib et al. (1998), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1998,1999ab), Christiano and Gust (1999).  By following a rule in which the central
bank responds to endogenous variables, the central bank may introduce real
indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria into an otherwise determinate economy.  These
sunspot fluctuations are welfare-reducing and can potentially be quite large.  Hence, an
important focus of this paper is to isolate the conditions sufficient to ensure that the
monetary policy rule does not introduce sunspot equilibria into the economy.
The paper’s analysis is conducted in the context of a fully articulated general
equilibrium model of a small open economy.  The underlying real model is essentially
that of Mendoza (1991).  Money is introduced by assuming that it is required to facilitate
certain transactions.  The paper considers both a flexible price economy in which
anticipated inflation effects are paramount, and a limited participation model [eg., Lucas
(1990), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997), Fuerst (1992)] in which unanticipated
money supply shocks have real effects.
1  The “smallness” assumption manifests itself in
                                                          
1 Open economy limited participation models include Baier (1997), Grilli and Roubini (1992), and2
the assumptions of perfect capital markets, and an exogenous worldwide real rate of
interest and real exchange rate. From a theoretical point of view, the “smallness”
assumption is particularly attractive, as many of the results that are obscured in a closed
economy are more readily apparent here.  Additionally, there are additional shocks (eg.,
the real exchange rate) that are not relevant to a closed economy.
The next two sections of the paper address the issue of real indeterminacy in a
small open economy with flexible prices (section II) and with limited participation
(section III).  A principle conclusion is that to avoid real indeterminacy the central bank
must respond aggressively to past movements in inflation.  It is well known that basing
policy responses on market expectations can generate non-uniqueness of equilibria.  For
this reason “looking forwards” tends to create indeterminacy because monetary policy is
driven by an endogenous variable that in turn depends on policy.
2
 A standard argument in the literature is that to avoid real indeterminacy the central
bank must respond aggressively to either expected inflation (see Clarida, Gali, Gertler
(1998)) or current inflation (see Kerr and King (1996)).  These analyses are all reduced-
form sticky price models, where the underlying structural model is a labor-only economy
and money is introduced via a money-in-the-utility function (MIUF) model with a zero
cross-partial between consumption and real balances.  In sharp contrast, we argue that a
necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is for the monetary authority to react
                                                                                                                                                                            
Schlagenhauff and Wrase (1995).
2 These questions are of more than academic interest. Several central banks around the world currently use
inflation forecasts as an important part of their decision-making on policy issues.  The recent funds rate
increases in the United States is evidence that such forecasts are used.  Although there were few signs that
current inflation was increasing, interest rates were raised at the August and November 1999 FOMC
meetings because it was feared that higher future inflation might very well be in the offing.3
aggressively to past movements in inflation.
 3
 The fundamental differences between our model and the above are two-fold.  First
as demonstrated in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), one major difference comes from the
assumption about which money balances enter the utility function.  The traditional MIUF
assumption is that end-of-period balances enter the functional.  But a direct extension of a
typical cash-in-advance economy suggests that the money the household has left after
leaving the bond market and before entering the goods market is more appropriate.
Remarkably this timing distinction is critical for questions of determinacy.  As argued in
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), the cash-in-advance timing is a more natural choice so that
we adopt it here.  We utilize a rigid cash-in-advance constraint but following the
arguments of our earlier paper, the results generalize to an arbitrary MIUF setup with CIA
timing.
 The second major difference is in the type of nominal rigidity analyzed. The
earlier papers assume a sticky price environment adopted from Calvo (1983).  The
assumption in that model is that a fixed fraction of firms adjust their prices every period.
This implies that for any arbitrarily long but finite period, not all prices will have adjusted
to the levels implied by a flexible price model.  Equivalently, for arbitrary initial
conditions, the deterministic dynamics converge to the flexible-price steady state only in
the infinite limit.  This pricing arrangement is problematic for issues of determinacy. For
example, in Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1998), an equilibrium is determinate if perturbations
from the equilibrium path lead to explosive inflation dynamics.  But surely the Calvo
                                                          
3 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999b) demonstrate that these results on indeterminacy are robust to a closed
economy model with a more elaborate production technology.4
pricing arrangement would not continue to hold along such a path, so that imposing this
arrangement along the path seems quite artificial. In this paper, we consider an alternative
nominal rigidity, namely the limited participation model mentioned above.  But more
importantly, we assume that this nominal rigidity arises for only a finite and definite time
period.  That is, for arbitrary initial conditions, the model converges to the flexible-price
steady state within a finite time period.  This assumption is more appropriate for the
analysis of the limiting behavior that is so important for stability analysis.
4
The final section of the paper turns to the long run issue of monetary policy—
what is the optimal long run rate of inflation?   By positing a Taylor rule in Sections II
and III, we assume that it is not optimal for the central bank to follow Milton Friedman’s
(1956) advice and engineer a long run deflation that will peg the nominal rate of interest
to zero.  There is an enormous literature concerning the robustness of Friedman’s
optimum quantity of money result (eg., Woodford (1990)). This paper provides a novel
explanation for a positive long run rate of inflation that is unique to a small open
economy.  This “smallness” implies that the domestic country takes the foreign nominal
rate of interest as given.  To the extent that this foreign rate distorts domestic behavior,
there is a rationale for positive domestic nominal rates.
II. A Flexible Price Model.
The economy consists of households, firms and financial intermediaries, the latter
accepts deposits from households and provides loans to firms.  The firms borrow cash to
                                                          
4 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) demonstrate that these same indeterminacy results hold for a sticky price
model in which prices are sticky for only a finite time period.5
finance their wage bill.  The households consume a single good that is produced abroad,
while the firms produce a single good that is sold abroad at real exchange rate et.  The
economy is small in that:  (1) the real exchange rate is taken as given, and (2) households’
foreign asset accumulation earns a constant real rate of return r.
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where E0  denotes   the   expectation  operator  conditional  on  time-0  information,  b ˛
(0,1)  is  the personal discount factor, ct is time-t consumption, and Lt  is time-t labor
supply.   To purchase consumption goods, households are subject to the following cash-
in-advance constraint:
t t t t t t t N L w P M c P - + £
where Pt is the price level, Mt denotes beginning-of-period cash balances, wt denotes the
real wage, and Nt denotes the household's choice of one-period bank deposits. These
deposits earn nominal rate Rt that is paid out at the end of the period.  The household's
intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 - + P + - - - + + = + + t t t t t t t t t t t t t t R N A A P c P rA L w P M M .
At denotes the household’s investment in foreign assets that earn the constant real rate of
return r, with b(1+r) = 1. Note that we are assuming that asset accumulation occurs at the
household level and that cash in advance is not needed to finance its purchase. P denotes
the profit flow from firms and financial intermediaries.
Firms in this economy produce an export good using a production function
employing domestic labor:6
) t t t t f(H e y q =
where qt is a measure of aggregate productivity, et is the real exchange rate, and Ht
denotes hired labor. One can imagine that f is constant returns or that land is an additional
fixed factor in the production function.  In the former case there are no profits to
distribute, while in the latter case the profit flow to equity owners is simply the rents on
land.  To finance its wage bill the firm must acquire cash and does so by borrowing cash
short term from the financial intermediary at (gross) rate Rt.
The intermediary in turn has two sources of cash, the cash deposited by
households and the new cash injected into the economy by the central bank.  Hence, the
loan constraint is:
) 1 ( - + £ t
s
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t.  Note that
monetary injections are carried out as lump sum transfers to the financial intermediary.
We restrict our attention to equilibria with strictly positive nominal interest rates so
that the two cash constraints are binding.  A recursive competitive equilibrium is given by
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The social resource constraint (4) comes from imposing market-clearing and netting out
the firm and intermediary profits from the household’s intertemporal budget constraint.





























The system given by (2), (4), and (5) is isomorphic to Mendoza’s (1991) corresponding
real business cycle (RBC) economy except, because of the CIA constraint, it is distorted
by a consumption tax rate of  (1+tct) = Rt.  Because of this implicit consumption tax, the
rate of return on foreign assets does not equal the usual consumption Euler equation
(equation (5)), and the marginal rate of substitution is not equal to the marginal product of
labor (equation (2)).
This public finance interpretation is key in what follows.  For example, Carlstrom
and Fuerst‘s (1995) result that a constant nominal interest rate is preferred to a variable
one is a manifestation of the standard result that constant taxes are better than fluctuating
ones (holding the mean distortion fixed).
5  However, as demonstrated by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1995) in a calibrated model, these welfare gains are quite small, and so our
attention is shifted to issues of indeterminacy.
                                                          
5 Such an interest rate smoothing policy is exactly the typical central bank policy over the seasonal cycle.8
Below we will consider monetary policy rules in which the nominal rate
(consumption tax) is endogenous, responding to movements in the economy. In a real
economy, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) demonstrate that the endogenous tax rate
movements implied by a balanced budget rule can lead to real indeterminacy.  An
important issue below is whether interest rate operating procedures can have the same
effect.
The small economy assumption makes stability analysis particularly transparent.
Without loss of generality we now limit the discussion to the deterministic version of the
model.  As is well known, if the deterministic dynamics are not unique, then it is possible












As mentioned above this relationship is not the standard Fisherian relationship.  The
above nominal interest rate is the rate between t+1 and t+2 not between t and t+1.  The
inflation rate, however, is between t and t+1 (pt+1 ” Pt+1/Pt).  The reason for this distortion
is because of the CIA constraint is on consumption but not investment. It is because of
this distortion that there is the potential for indeterminacy.
Proposition 1: Suppose that monetary policy is given by the forward-looking interest rate
rule given by:
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Then in the flexible-price model there is real determinacy if and only if 0 £ t < 1. In any
event, there is always nominal indeterminacy as pt is free.
Proof:  Since (6) starts at t+1 we scroll (7) ahead one period.  Taking logs of (7)
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Exploiting the recursion in (8) we have
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Using equation (6), this then implies that
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For real determinacy we need this mapping to be explosive.  Hence, there is real
determinacy if and only if 0 £ t < 1.  If this is the case then pt+j is determined for j ‡ 1.
From (7) this pins down  Rt+j for j ‡ 0 so that (1)-(4) uniquely pin down the inflation rate
and real behavior.  Since (11) starts with pt+1, the initial price level is free, pt is free.
QED
An immediate corollary to the above theorem is that an interest rate peg (t = 0)
delivers real determinacy, but like the other rules, has nominal indeterminacy.
 Under the policy rule given by (8) (the linearized version of (7)), the monetary
authority responds with an elasticity of t to a geometric weighted-average of all future10
expected inflation rates, where more weight is placed on the near-future.  A special case
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Under this policy rule, increases in expected inflation increase the nominal rate.
But for active policies (t > 1), these nominal rate increases are also associated with
increases in the real rate of interest.  Thus, we have an implicit consumption tax (the
nominal rate) correlated tightly with expected consumption growth (the real rate).  The
self-fulfilling circle goes something like this.  An increase in expected inflation increases
investment demand lowering current consumption.  The decline in current consumption
increases the real rate of interest; with t > 1, the nominal rate (consumption tax) rises
sharply with this real rate movement; this tax movement implies that the initial increase
in expected inflation and decline in current consumption are rational.
The fact that pt is free for all values of t is just a manifestation of nominal
indeterminacy, i.e., there is nothing to pin down the initial growth rate of money.  This
innocent remark has some interesting implications:
Proposition 2: Suppose that monetary policy is given by a forward-looking rule that
includes the current inflation rate,






































Then in the flexible price model there is real indeterminacy for all values of t „ 0.11
Proof:  The proof proceeds as before leading to the following difference equation
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Under appropriate conditions this is explosive so that pt+j is pinned down for j ‡ 1.  But
even in this case pt is free and hence so is Rt.   Thus we have real indeterminacy.  Once
again if t = 0, we have an interest rate peg and there is no real indeterminacy.  QED
The nominal indeterminacy from before is now real.  Before pt being free had no
real affect but now given our interest rate rule Rt is now free.  Since Rt acts like a tax on
consumption the fact that Rt is not pinned down implies that real behavior is
indeterminate.  The reason for this indeterminacy is because our policy rule is responding
to endogenous variables.  This is why an interest rate peg (t = 0) is determinate.
This discussion suggests that the central bank should look further backwards so
that it only responds to exogenous variables.  Remarkably, by looking backwards the
conditions for determinacy are (almost) entirely flipped on their head from when the
Taylor Rule is forward looking.
Proposition 3: Suppose that monetary policy is given by the backward-looking interest
rate rule given by
). 1 , 0 [ , , 0 ,
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Then in the flexible-price model there is real determinacy if and only if t = 0 or t > 1.  In
the case of t > 1, there is also nominal determinacy.12
Proof:  Following the strategy pursued in Proposition 1, we are led to the difference
equation
1 2
~ ] ) 1 ( [ ~
+ + - + = t t R R t l l
For real determinacy we thus need t > 1, which then implies pt+j is pinned down for j ‡ 0.
QED
An interest rate peg is determinate but like before has nominal indeterminacy.
Notice, however, that if the monetary authority responds aggressively to past inflation (t
> 1), initial inflation and hence the initial money stock, is pinned down.  This result is a
general equilibrium generalization of McCallum’s (1981) earlier result.  He argued that
because an interest rate peg suffered from nominal indeterminacy the monetary authority
needed a nominal anchor, which could be accomplished by responding to a nominal
variable.  Proposition (3) confirms this but shows that merely responding to a nominal
variable, like past inflation, is not enough.  The monetary authority has to aggressively
respond to past inflation to ensure nominal determinacy.
For completeness, we consider a backward looking rule in which the central bank
also considers the current inflation rate.
Proposition 4: Suppose that monetary policy is given by a backward-looking interest rate
rule that also includes the current inflation rate:






































Then in the flexible-price model there is real determinacy if and only if t = 0 or 1 < t <
(1+l)/(1-l).  In the case of 1 < t <  (1+l)/(1-l), there is also nominal determinacy.
Proof:  Following the strategy pursued in Proposition 3, we are led to the difference
equation
t t R R ~
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For determinacy, the term in brackets must be outside the unit circle.  There are two
regions to consider.  First if t(1-l) < 1 the bracketed term exceeds unity whenever t > 1.











Combining the two regions we have the region noted in the Proposition.  QED
With an active policy looking backwards can render the economy determinate.
Yet the more weight that is placed on the distant past (the larger is l) the bounds for
determinacy shrink.
Although at this stage nominal indeterminacy is merely a nuisance, its presence
becomes critical in the next section when we consider how the presence of a particular
type of nominal rigidity, namely sluggish portfolios, affects the above results.14
III. A Limited Participation Model.
A natural criticism of the previous analysis is that it was conducted in a monetary
model in which only anticipated inflation has real effects. For example, under most of the
policies considered there is nominal indeterminacy in the flexible-price model implying
that an iid shock to the money supply has no effect on any real variables.
6  This section
extends the analysis to a more compelling model of monetary non-neutrality in which iid
shocks have real effects.
The model we choose to examine is the limited participation model [eg., Lucas
(1990), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Fuerst (1992)].  There are at least two reasons
for this choice. First, in contrast to sticky price models there has been very little work on
indeterminacy issues in this type of model.
7  Second, there is a compelling empirical
reason to consider such a model.  A well-known empirical phenomenon is that in
response to a positive monetary policy innovation (a movement downward in the nominal
interest rate), aggregate real behavior displays a hump-shaped time profile, while prices
rise slowly to a higher level.  A hump-shaped consumption profile implies an increase in
the real rate of interest, while an upward movement in prices implies that expected
inflation cannot fall.  But then we are left with a puzzle—how can nominal interest rates
                                                          
6 This exception is a backward-looking Taylor rule when t > 1.  Otherwise the fact that initial money
growth is free implies that iid shocks to money growth will also achieve the interest rate directive.
7 A notable exception is Christiano and Gust (1998).  There are two important differences between their
analysis and the model presented here.  First, they assume that investment purchases are subject to a cash-
in-advance constraint, while this paper makes the more standard assumption that investment is a credit
good.  Second, in their model the portfolio rigidity is forever rigid in that the deterministic dynamics
converge to the flexible-price model only in the limit.  This is analogous to a Calvo (1983) pricing
arrangement.15
fall?  The obvious answer is that over some time horizon the standard Fisherian interest
rate determination is broken, ie., equation (3) must not hold over some time interval.
This is exactly the assumption made in limited participation models.  In particular,
these models assume that the (nominal) portfolio choice (Nt) is made one period in
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With Nt predetermined, this implies that monetary shocks increase employment and
domestic output, while driving down the domestic nominal interest rate.  From a policy
perspective, the more important observation is that employment does not respond to
productivity or real exchange rate shocks because these shocks drive the nominal interest
rate upwards.  This sluggishness makes a clear case for monetary policy—vary money
growth to accommodate these shocks.  Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) use this as a starting
point to make the case for interest rate pegging in this model.  Once again, the welfare
gains are small.
Because of this we turn to stability analysis. The attractive feature of the limited
participation model is that it breaks the rigid Fisherian interest rate determination.  But16
for the stability properties of interest rate operating procedures, this turns out to be
somewhat disastrous since the interest rate is no longer linked to underlying real variables
such as consumption growth and expected inflation.
As before, we need only consider the deterministic dynamics.  After one period
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For stability analysis, the system of equations includes equations (16)-(17), the labor
equation (2), and the resource constraint (4).
Equation (16) is familiar from before.  Under suitable conditions on the interest
rate operating procedure it will pin down inflation and interest rate dynamics.  The
novelty is in (17)—the limited participation constraint implies that there is little to pin
down the initial Uc(t) and thus the initial asset accumulation decision, even if the initial
nominal interest rate is determined.
For any hopes of determinacy we need an extra restriction.  The limited
participation constraint provides one: Nt is a pre-determined nominal variable.17
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Since Mt and Nt are predetermined, this provides an additional restriction (in the flexible
price model Nt is free and (18) does not restrict real behavior).   In particular, if a policy
rule pins down the current price level Pt, then the additional restriction in (18) will pin
down the initial consumption-asset-accumulation decision.  Hence, the only way of
achieving determinacy is if the interest rate operating procedure pins down the current pt
” Pt /Pt-1.  This immediately implies the following:
Proposition 5: Suppose that monetary policy is given by either a forward-looking (7) or a
current/forward-looking (12) Taylor rule.  Then in the limited participation model there
is real indeterminacy for all values of t.
And its corollary:
Proposition 6: Suppose that monetary policy is given by a backward-looking Taylor rule
(13).  Then in the limited participation model there is real determinacy if and only if t >
1.  Suppose that monetary policy is given by the current/backward-looking Taylor rule
given in (14).  Then there is real determinacy if and only if 1 < t <  (1+l)/(1-l).
Notice that a forward-looking Taylor rule and an interest rate peg both suffer from
real indeterminacy.  The reason is because they both had nominal indeterminacy in the18
corresponding flexible price economy.
8  An active backward-looking Taylor rule,
however, pins down the price level.  Since portfolios are pre-determined in nominal
terms, this price level determination pins down an extra real variable.
IV. A Flexible Price Model with Two Currencies.
This section changes the nature of the analysis from the short-run (policy across
the business cycle) to the long-run (the long run rate of inflation).  Since our focus is on
the long run we ignore dynamic issues, and instead concentrate on steady-state analysis.
In terms of modeling, this section builds on the earlier model by assuming that the
home country agent has preferences over both the imported and the exported good and
that the imported good must be paid for with foreign currency accumulated in advance.
9
Hence, we have a model with two cash constraints, and thus two implicit consumption
taxes.  The imported good is taxed at the foreign interest rate, while the domestically-
produced good is taxed at the domestic interest rate.  In Section II, domestic currency
could be used for all transactions so that there was only one implicit tax—the domestic
interest rate.  But now there are two taxes, one of which the domestic central bank takes
as exogenous.  In this environment it may not be optimal for the home country to follow
Friedman’s dictum and drive the domestic nominal interest rate to zero.
Household preferences over the imported good (good two), the domestically
produced good (good one), and work effort are given by
                                                          
8 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) show that an interest rate peg suffers from real indeterminacy in a closed-
economy limited participation model.
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To finance its consumption purchases the household uses cash accumulated in advance
and thus faces the following cash constraints:
t t t t t t N L W M c P 1 1 1 1 - + £ (21)
t t t t N M c P 2 2 2 2 - £ (22)
where Mit denotes holdings of the home (i = 1) and foreign (i = 2) currency, Pit denotes
the nominal price of goods i = 1,2, Wt denotes the nominal wage expressed in home
currency, and Nit denotes the bank deposits denominated in the two currencies i = 1,2.
The intertemporal constraint (expressed in home currency) is thus given by:
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t
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M s M
+ - + - + P + - - + +
= + + +
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where Rit denotes the nominal interest rate denominated in the two currencies i = 1,2, st is
the end of period nominal exchange rate, and Xt is a currency transfer from the foreign
government. Since this is a small open economy, we need to exogenously impose an
equilibrium condition on domestically-owned bank deposits of foreign currency.  For
simplicity we assume that these are in zero net supply so that one equilibrium condition
imposed below will be N2t =0.  Similarly, since our focus is on steady-state issues we
abstract from real foreign asset accumulation (At).   This is without loss of generality.
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As for the firm, it produces good 1 using the production technology from before,
and subject to the need to borrow domestic currency to finance its wage bill.  In addition,
it imports good 2 at an exogenous terms of trade. (As before, the imported good is the
numeraire, so that et is the real price of good 1 in terms of good 2.)  The firm then sells
the two goods at the respective prices Pit.  Since the firm does not distribute dividends
until the end of the period, it maximizes its end of period profits.  Hence, purchasing
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where  t s ˆ is the beginning of period or “spot” exchange rate.  The fact that (25) does not
hold with the spot exchange rate, but instead with the end-of-period exchange rate, is a
manifestation of the cash-in-advance distortion.




























As noted earlier, this is now a model with two implicit consumption taxes, both of which
are manifested in (26)-(27).  The home-produced good (good one) is taxed at the
domestic nominal rate, while the imported good (good two) is taxed at the foreign rate of
interest.  For a given foreign interest rate it is clear that the central bank faces a second-
best problem.  Setting the domestic rate to match the foreign rate may alleviate one
distortion (equation (27)) but exacerbates another (equation (26)).
The social resource constraint comes from imposing the equilibrium decision-
rules and market-clearing conditions on the household’s intertemporal constraint.  As
previously, we assume that only domestic households hold domestic currency.  Hence, we
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where 
a
t M 2 denotes per capita foreign cash balances held by the representative domestic
household (in the earlier model domestic households held no foreign cash).
In the steady-state, domestic labor supply and purchases of the two goods are
constant.  Since we are uninterested in the wealth effects coming from exogenous foreign
price movements, we assume that
  2 2 1 2 ) ( c P P X t t t - ” + (29)22
where c2 is the steady-state level of the imported good.
10  The household takes this
transfer as exogenous so that it does not affect marginal decision-making, but is only felt
at the aggregate resource level.  In particular, with the transfer given by (29), the binding
CIA constraint implies that foreign money holdings drop out of the resource constraint so
that the steady-state resource constraint is given by
) ( 2 1 L f e c ec q = + . (30)
The steady-state welfare problem is to maximize (20) subject to (26), (27) and (30).
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For our benchmark calibration, we set to one the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, (1/s), and the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption goods
(1/d); the labor supply elasticity, (1/h), to 0.333; and the labor share to a = 2/3.  We also
normalize q = 1, e = 1, and m = 1.  The latter implies an import share of [c2/(c2 + c1)] =
0.47.   The foreign interest rate is set at R2 = 1.06. We then chose n so that with R1 =
1.06, we have L = 1/3.
                                                          
10 Thus this assumption is in the spirit of Lucas (1982) who assumes that domestic and foreign households
are insured against “seigniorage risk”. Without this assumption the analysis would proceed with an inflation
tax term in the aggregate resource constraint (30).23
Figures 1-3 present the results for differing values of the elasticity of substitution
between the two consumption goods (1/d), differing values of the labor supply elasticity
(1/h), and differing import shares (variations in m).  Across all three figures all other
parameters are held constant except for the one being analyzed.
The figures reveal standard second-best intuition.  When there are two distorted
margins, the benevolent planner will choose to more heavily distort the margin that is less
elastic or less important. The two margins here are the labor-leisure choice (26) and the
good 1 vs. good 2 choice (27).  The first distortion is eliminated with a zero nominal rate
(a gross rate of unity) while the second distortion is eliminated by matching the foreign
interest rate.
Figures 1-3 have the qualitative shape that one would expect.  As 1/d goes to zero,
and demands become highly inelastic, the distortionary impact of divergent nominal
interest rates declines. Hence, the optimal response is to lower the distortion on the labor
margin by lowering the domestic interest rate.  As labor supply becomes highly inelastic
and 1/t goes to zero, just the opposite is true, and the optimal response is to more closely
match the foreign rate.  Figure 3 reveals that as the importance of the foreign sector rises,
the cost of this distortion rises.  Hence, as the foreign share rises, the optimal response is
to move closer to the foreign rate.  Notice that except under extreme parameter values, the
optimal domestic rate is significantly different from Friedman’s zero.
Before closing, it is instructive to compare this steady-state analysis to the
corresponding dynamic Ramsey problem (eg.,  Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996)).  In
the present context, the key issue is the form of the aggregate resource constraint.  For the
household budget constraint to collapse into the form given by (30), one needs to24
preclude an initial and one-time flight from the foreign currency (a possibility that, by
assumption, cannot arise in a steady-state analysis).  That is, if the Ramsey planner began
with the level of foreign cash balances given by the steady-state problem, he would
encourage a one-time drop in these currency holdings by setting the domestic nominal
rate to zero.  This lower domestic rate would lead the household to decrease its
consumption of foreign goods and thus lower its holdings of foreign currency. For all
future periods this flight would leave the domestic household at a period-by-period utility
level lower than the utility level from the steady-state problem (as consumption of the
imported good would be forever lower).  To rule out this type of behavior, we must
replace (29) with the stronger condition
) ( 2 2 1 2 1 2 t t t t t c P c P X - ” + + . (31)
This transfer scheme imposes an implicit tax on currency flight.  Once again the domestic
household takes this transfer as exogenous and thus it does not enter private marginal
conditions.  However, the Ramsey planner is affected by these transfers and they lead to
an aggregate resource constraint like (30).  Hence, under the assumption (31), the steady-
state analysis and the dynamic Ramsey problem are equivalent.
V. Conclusion.
This paper has utilized a standard open economy model to address two classic
questions in monetary policy:  (1) what is the appropriate monetary policy across the
business cycle and (2) what is the optimal long run rate of inflation?
Recent research suggests that an important issue for the first question is what
policy restrictions ensure that the central bank’s policy rule does not introduce real25
indeterminacy and sunspot fluctuations into an otherwise stable economy.  The message
is clear: the central bank should respond aggressively to lagged inflation rates.  From the
standpoint of indeterminacy issues, a policy that targets current and future expected
inflation is disastrous.  Responding “passively” to only future expected inflation or
targeting the nominal interest rate may avoid real indeterminacy in a flexible price model.
However, these policies are disastrous when the economy is subject to a nominal rigidity
such as that implied by limited participation.  In terms of exchange rates, to the extent
that a pegged exchange rate implies that the domestic nominal interest rate is given
exogenously by the foreign country, then a pegged exchange rate is also subject to real
indeterminacy and sunspot fluctuations.
As for the second question concerning the long run rate of inflation, a small open
economy faces an exogenous foreign interest rate.  Almost certainly this rate distorts
domestic behavior.  Hence, the central bank immediately faces a second-best problem.
One distortion (a positive foreign rate) can be worse than two distortions (a positive
domestic and foreign interest rate).  This is a novel reason to stay clear of Friedman’s
zero nominal rate.
This paper’s general equilibrium or structural approach to policy evaluation has
many advantages including an obvious welfare criterion (lifetime utility of the typical
agent) and a clear articulation of what parameters are policy invariant.  General
equilibrium analysis forces one to be specific, and as always the devil is in the details.
An example illustrates this point.  King and Wolman (1996) analyze a sticky-price
general equilbrium model and conclude that strict price level targeting is the optimal
monetary policy.  In contrast, the results of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) imply that a26
plausible alteration in their modeling of money demand implies that an aggressive price
level target is actually destabilizing and introduces sunspot equilibria into the economy.
Which conclusion is correct?  One must examine the details, all of which are obscured by
a simple reduced form model.27
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